But that could well be vanilla sex. Lets be honest here: A lot of people don’t have sex with another human at all. Despite the over-sexualisation in our society less people have sex.

Marriage rates are on a decline. Birth rates are on the decline. More people then ever live on there own. And the only sexual partner they have is a porn actor or actress.

And this is why some people argue against sex bots. Not to protect robots or children. Especially not robots. Because for the foreseeable future they will just be oversized Fleshlights or Didos. And why would anybody want to protect the rights of a Fleshlight or Dido?

There is no rational reason here. However, there is a hidden agenda. Same as banning prostitution and recent moves to ban porn:

They want men and women to marry again.

But those who shout for bans get cause and effect wrong. The true reason for the decline of the marriage rate is the change in divorce law in 1970th.

It took over a generation for the effect to fully mature. But google #MGTOW and see what the no fault divorce did to society.

Although I don’t know if most people would buy a sexbot for “vanilla sex,” doesn’t it reason to say that many people would be interested in getting sexbots for types of sex they can’t get humans to have with them? At least not easily?

Same as most porn show bog standard vanilla sex.

You raise great points. In the comments section here, I’m not personally putting forth an argument that child sex robots or robots designed to fulfill rape fantasies should be illegal or legal. The whole discussion is fascinating, however, and there are so many angles to explore, especially since there is so much data we don’t have and because such robots do not yet exist.

I’m not convinced that because a user and manufacturer of such a robot might both agree that it’s designed to emulate rape fantasies that that has anything to do with sexual consent. The robot cannot consent, and it’s just being treated like property. If a man was to tell another man it would be OK if the other man acted out his rape fantasies on his wife, and the second man agreed, that has nothing to do with the woman. That doesn’t bring out true sexual consent. However, as Danaher’s arguments rule out personhood of the robot, to me consent of the robot is besides the point because it’s not considered conscious.

What you say about consent in BDSM communities makes sense. In such spaces, the people involved are actively seeking consent and talking about it, if it’s healthy BDSM. I’ve heard people say such sexual experiences can often be more consensual because people actually ask first if certain actions are OK. On the other hand, a lot of people outside the BDSM community don’t have such discussions but rely on social cues that can of course be misread. But I’ve also heard about abuse in BDSM communities that was NOT consensual.

To play devil’s advocate, these assertions by Danaher are based on assumptions of social and moral standards which are not held to be universally true. While I am personally a staunch supporter of consent-first sexuality, I have taken note that there is a trend for social groups to assume the worst about a given scenario if it appears to emulate something they see as abhorrent.
To draw an example; play-rape in a kinky, but safe-sane-consensual partnership. Rationally, if both parties are consenting, aware of the risks (both physical and emotional), and are still mutually interested in pursuing the fantasy rape scenario while engaging in risk-reducing methods, does it not rationally stand to reason that these consenting individuals are morally correct in their decisions? Yet, still, society as a larger whole seems to consider these scenarios completely unacceptable for the perception that it is somehow “too close to the real thing.” That is not the fault of the consenting individuals engaged in their mutually-pleasurable activities, but instead in society for not being perceptive enough to see the difference. I do not believe we should be bowing to this prudish hivemind mentality, but instead seeking to engage and educate others so that they may understand the logical decision-making which lead the individuals to make their choices to explore such fantasies.
Extending this argument in to the realm of artificial rape simulation: If it is the user and manufacturer’s consenting agreement that the function of the product is to emulate such sexual fantasies, then what right does society have to dictate otherwise? If the product meets the regulated standards for safety, and the user does not risk any non-informed and non-consenting individual or group with the use of the device, what ground does morality have to stand on against the intended use of the rape simulator?
The argument is made that fantasizing about or emulating rape or abuse in a controlled environment somehow displays a lack of sensitivity to their meanings. However, I have not seen any attempts at detailed and precise explanations of the conditions of that argument. In fact, it has been my personal experience that the opposite holds most true. It is often individuals who have a deep and personal understanding of actual rape experiences or the motivators behind their occurance which seek out healthy and controlled simulations of the behaviour. The people who actively and actually engage in REAL rape are the ones who demonstrate lacks of sensitivity. By the very nature of attempting to engage in a simulation of activity, the participants demonstrate that they ARE actively attempting to be sensitive and conscientious of the meaning behind their actions.

And then there’s the other argument about what constitutes a “child,” as that too is different in various cultures and societies, and leads to the questions of “what constitutes a robot or simulation of a child?” While legally speaking, there is generally a clear-cut answer in many countries around the world, it is a murkier subject when you approach it from a logical standpoint of human behavioural science and biology.
Food for thought.

Thanks for the comment. Most people seem to be unwilling to criminalize based on the moralistic premise, that it offends the community. Though Danaher’s other argument about how such acts show a lack of sensitivity to the social meaning of rape and child sexual abuse is intriguing. True, if using these robots makes someone less likely to hurt a real person, that’s fantastic. On the other hand, Danaher does explore how robotic rape may make someone more inclined to hurt real people, so I’m not so quick to disregard that perspective.